MOEX · Stocks

Quant models

Six classic models on company reports and Moscow Exchange prices: default risk, price and profitability, financial checks, profit and cash flow, growth implied by the price, and the dividend gap.

2025 annual reports
Companies covered 114 each model has its own list
Default risk above 5% a year 13 out of 69 companies with debt
All checks passed 10 out of 114, Piotroski checks
Dividend gap closes in 12 days median over closed gaps
Estimated default probabilitythe Merton model
Closest to default: EUTR (EuroTrans), buffer 0.60 σ, probability of default within a year 27.5%
The risk is above 5% a year for 13 out of 69 companies with debt. The estimate comes from the market share price and is not a credit rating.
Companies with debt69 out of 114 covered
Default risk above 5% a year13 buffer below 1.64 σ
Median buffer3.31 σ across companies with debt
Model rate14% Bank of Russia key rate
one-year default probability —
buffer — σ - the size of the buffer: by how many typical yearly swings the value of the assets exceeds the debt.
Default risk above 5% a year
debt median assets in a year
0%
How it is calculated

A company's assets are shared between creditors and shareholders. Creditors come first: shareholders get what is left after the debt is repaid. If the value of the assets falls to the size of the debt, nothing is left for shareholders. The Merton model treats that state as default.

The model measures the buffer between asset value and debt not in roubles but in standard deviations. One sigma is the usual range of swings in asset value over a year: 24-39% for companies with little debt and 17-30% for heavily indebted ones (debt swings less than shares, so the more debt, the calmer the assets). The more sigmas fit into the buffer, the lower the probability of default: at three sigmas it is close to zero, at half a sigma it exceeds 30%. The buffer is calculated for 69 companies out of 114: the rest have negative net debt or lack a debt or volatility forecast.

V=E+DσV=EV σE+DV (0.05+0.25 σE)DD=ln⁡(V/D)+(r−σV2/2)TσVTPD=N(−DD)\begin{aligned}&V = E + D \\[4pt] &\sigma_V = \tfrac{E}{V}\,\sigma_E + \tfrac{D}{V}\,(0.05 + 0.25\,\sigma_E) \\[10pt] &\mathrm{DD} = \frac{\ln(V/D) + \left(r - \sigma_V^2/2\right) T}{\sigma_V \sqrt{T}} \\[10pt] &\mathrm{PD} = N(-\mathrm{DD})\end{aligned}
EE
market cap
DD
net debt (estimate: forecast EBITDA and debt/EBITDA)
VV
assets
σE\sigma_E
share volatility
σV\sigma_V
asset volatility
rr
key rate (the model's risk-free rate)
TT
1 year
NN
standard normal distribution function
DD\mathrm{DD}
buffer in sigmas (distance to default)
PD\mathrm{PD}
one-year default probability
Model assumptions

Asset volatility is not observed directly and is estimated from equity volatility. The direct conversion σV = σE·E/V understates it under high leverage: when debt is several times the market cap, assets come out almost risk-free and a heavily indebted company looks more stable than Sberbank. The Bharath - Shumway adjustment gives debt its own volatility of 0.05 + 0.25·σE. The second model assumption: the expected return on assets is set equal to the key rate. For highly leveraged companies it makes up most of the buffer, so when the rate falls the estimated risk rises.

Smallest buffer
The percentage is the probability of default within a year.
The estimate is based on the market share price and is not a credit rating.
An issuer's ordinary and preferred shares are counted together; each issuer takes one row in the list.
Price and profitabilityGreenblatt ranking
First place - VSEH (VI.ru): EBITDA at 32.9% of enterprise value with a 72% return on equity
Next come AFLT and NMTP.
Companies ranked83 out of 114 covered
Median EBITDA / EV21% the higher, the cheaper the business
Median return14% ROE, profit to equity
Margin instead of ROE10 marked with an asterisk
Price and profitability: all companies
The further right a dot is, the more EBITDA per rouble of enterprise value, so the cheaper the business. The higher, the higher the return on equity. Dashed lines are market medians; the highlighted corner is where a company is both cheaper and more profitable than the median. The top ten companies are labelled.
How it is calculated

The model picks companies that combine a high return on capital with a low price for the business. Profitability is measured by ROE and price by EBITDA to enterprise value (EV): the higher this ratio, the cheaper the business. The model adds up not the metrics themselves but the places on each one - otherwise a single extreme value would decide the whole result. The place is calculated for 83 companies out of 114: the rest lack one of the two metrics.

Model assumptions
Place = rank by EBITDA to enterprise value + rank by profitability. Greenblatt uses EBIT and return on invested capital (ROIC); here we use EBITDA and return on equity (ROE), and where ROE is unreliable, the EBITDA margin - such values are marked with an asterisk. This is an adaptation of the model, not Greenblatt's original calculation.
Financial checkseight Piotroski checks
All checks passed for 10 companies out of 114
The check passed least often is "Profit is backed by cash": 18% of the companies it is calculated for pass it.
All checks passed10 out of 114 covered
Median share passed50% across all companies
Passed least often18% Profit is backed by cash
passed out of those calculated —
share passed —
none passed all passed
How it is calculated

The Piotroski model separates cheap companies whose financials are improving from cheap companies whose financials are getting worse. Each check is a yes-or-no question: is there a profit, is cash flow positive, is revenue growing, is net debt no more than two EBITDA. Each "yes" scores a point; there are eight checks, so the score runs from 0 to 8. A single check proves nothing, what matters is the total.

Model assumptions
Piotroski has nine checks, some of them based on the balance sheet, which is not in the data. Here there are eight checks with the same substance, built from the data available for 2025: an adaptation, not the original calculation. A check without data counts as neither passed nor failed - it drops out of the denominator. Banks do not report revenue and EBITDA in the usual form, so they have fewer than eight checks; only the share passed is comparable, and the chart is built on it.
Which checks are passed least often
Profit is backed by cash 18%
Margin grew 34%
Profit grew 45%
Cash flow above zero two years running 46%
Free cash flow above zero 55%
Revenue grew 68%
Debt below 2 EBITDA on forecast 68%
Profitable year 82%
The share of companies that pass the check, out of those for which it is calculated. Why profit is so rarely backed by cash is covered on the "Profit and cash flow" tab.
Share of checks passed across the market
100% 10
75-99% 28
50-74% 36
25-49% 29
0-24% 11
Profit and cash flowthe Sloan gap
29 companies out of 77 with a profit have negative free cash flow
The report shows a profit, but there is no cash at the end of the year. Another 19 companies ended the year with a loss; the metric is not calculated for them.
Companies with a profit77 metric calculated
Negative cash flow29 despite a reported profit
Median share32% of profit backed by cash
Year with a loss19 not calculated
Distribution across the market
< 0% 29
0-50% 17
50-100% 17
100-150% 6
> 150% 8
Another 19 companies ended the year with a loss - the metric is not calculated for them: a share of profit backed by cash makes no sense when profit is negative.
How it is calculated

Reported profit is not the same as cash received: goods shipped on deferred payment count as profit, but the money has not come in. Richard Sloan showed that companies whose profit exceeds cash flow year after year systematically do worse in the following years: the part not backed by cash eventually has to be written off. Here we use a simplified metric - the share of profit backed by cash flow in 2025.

cash-backed=free cash flownet income\text{cash-backed} = \frac{\text{free cash flow}}{\text{net income}}
< 0%profit, but negative cash flow
0-50%less than half of the profit is backed by cash
50-100%part of the profit is not backed by cash
100-150%cash flow above profit
> 150%cash flow far above profit - this also happens when investment is cut
Model assumptions

The metric flags not the quality of the business but the gap between profit and cash flow, and it errs both ways. A high share proves nothing by itself: cash flow also exceeds profit when capital spending is cut. A low share is not necessarily a problem: free cash flow is counted after capital spending, so for developers and companies with large investment programmes it is naturally negative.

Smallest share backed by cash
The bar shows the share of profit backed by cash flow. A negative share means that cash flow was negative despite a reported profit. The bar has two ticks: zero on the left and 100% on the right, the level of full backing. The left end of the scale starts at the lowest value in the list: otherwise the other bars would be indistinguishable.
What the price impliesreverse DCF
For 26 out of 63 companies with a FairValue forecast the price implies faster cash flow growth than our forecast
For another 14 the price implies growth faster than 40% a year, and for 15 a shrinking flow.
Answer found72 out of 114 covered
Faster than the FairValue forecast26 out of 63 with a forecast
Growth faster than 40% a year14 implied by the price
Shrinking cash flow15 implied by the price
Most of the value comes from the years beyond the forecast horizon, so the answer swings sharply with the growth rate. This is a property of the model itself, not a verdict on the company.
How it is calculated

A standard discounted cash flow (DCF) calculation starts from a forecast: the cash flows are discounted to give a fair price. Rappaport and Mauboussin proposed turning the problem around. The market price is known, so the expectations built into it can be backed out. The model finds the cash flow growth rate at which today's price is fair.

This number proves nothing by itself: it only means something next to the company's actual growth rate. A price implying 30% a year for a company whose revenue is shrinking is a gap you can see at once.

EV=market cap+net debtEV=∑tFCFt(1+r)t+TV(1+r)NFCFt=FCFt−1 (1+g)= after the forecast yearsr=EV (rf+β⋅ERP)+DV (rf+s)(1−tax)\begin{aligned}&\mathrm{EV} = \text{market cap} + \text{net debt} \\[8pt]&\mathrm{EV} = \sum_t \frac{\mathrm{FCF}_t}{(1+r)^t} + \frac{\mathrm{TV}}{(1+r)^N} \\[8pt]&\mathrm{FCF}_t = \mathrm{FCF}_{t-1}\,(1 + g) \\[-2pt]&\qquad \phantom{=}\ \small\text{after the forecast years} \\[4pt]&r = \tfrac{E}{V}\,(r_f + \beta\cdot\mathrm{ERP}) + \tfrac{D}{V}\,(r_f + s)(1 - \text{tax})\end{aligned}
EV=market cap+net debtEV=∑tFCFt(1+r)t+TV(1+r)NFCFt=FCFt−1 (1+g)= after the forecast yearsr=EV (rf+β⋅ERP)+DV (rf+s)(1−tax)\begin{aligned}&\mathrm{EV} = \text{market cap} + \text{net debt} \\[8pt]&\mathrm{EV} = \sum_t \frac{\mathrm{FCF}_t}{(1+r)^t} + \frac{\mathrm{TV}}{(1+r)^N} \\[8pt]&\mathrm{FCF}_t = \mathrm{FCF}_{t-1}\,(1 + g) \\[-2pt]&\qquad \phantom{=}\ \small\text{after the forecast years} \\[4pt]&r = \tfrac{E}{V}\,(r_f + \beta\cdot\mathrm{ERP}) \\ &\qquad {} + \tfrac{D}{V}\,(r_f + s)(1 - \text{tax})\end{aligned}
gg
the growth rate we solve for
FCF\mathrm{FCF}
the company's free cash flow
TV\mathrm{TV}
value of the cash flows beyond the forecast horizon
β\beta
beta to the Moscow Exchange index
rfr_f
10-year OFZ yield
ss
credit risk premium based on the debt load
Model assumptions

The growth rate g is found by trial: the present value rises with it, so there is only one solution. Beta is calculated from the stock's price history. The risk-free part of the discount rate comes from the current OFZ yield curve, and the credit risk premium rises with the debt load. Without it, a company with debt of five EBITDA would get the lowest rate and look the most undervalued.

An answer is found for 72 companies out of 114. For another 14 the price requires growth faster than 40% a year, for 4 - the flow shrinking faster than 20% a year. 18 have negative free cash flow or none in the forecast: with a negative flow the model values a company higher the faster its loss grows, so such stocks are left out. 6 lack debt data or have a negative enterprise value.

Dividend gapprice drop and recovery after the record date
The median time to close the gap is 12 days
At a yield of up to 3% - 5 days, above 15% - 108 days; for 13% of payouts the gap did not close within a year.
Payouts in the sample1190 across 107 stocks since 2013
Median time to close12 days median over closed gaps
Not closed within a year13% share of payouts
Lead before the record date+2.14% median over three weeks
What happens to the price around the record date
Median path over 1190 payouts of 107 securities: zero is the price on the eve of the gap
The line is the median over all payouts in the group, not a typical case: a single stock can behave quite differently around its record date. Time to close is the median over the payouts where the gap closed; the share that did not close is shown alongside. The MOEX index is shown over the same windows: in a rising market the price gets back to its old level with no link to the dividend at all.
How it is calculated

On the record date the share price drops by roughly the size of the dividend. This drop is called the dividend gap. The calculation shows how long it takes the price to return to its old level and what that time depends on. The sample is 1190 payouts on 107 stocks since 2013.

The main factor is the size of the payout: the larger it is, the deeper the drop and the longer the price takes to recover. Time to close counts only gaps that closed, and for 13% of payouts the gap did not close within a year, so the median is understated for stocks with many such payouts.

Model assumptions

The gap date is calculated rather than taken from the data: the database stores the record date, and the price used to drop the day before it until August 2023 and on that date afterwards - that is how the exchange settlement cycle changed. If the register closes on a weekend, the gap falls on Friday. Weekend sessions count as part of Monday, so the days here are business days. Payouts before September 2013 are excluded: no gap shows up on them with either date.

Time to close by dividend size
Yielddividend Payoutsin the sample Declineshare of the dividend Closedwithin 20 days Closedover the year Recoverymedian, days Leadvs index before record date
up to 3% 452 0.73 74% 95% 5 +0.67%
3-6% 378 0.76 49% 88% 16 +2.12%
6-9% 200 0.81 27% 79% 35 +3.23%
9-15% 134 0.85 23% 76% 44 +4.93%
above 15% 26 0.89 8% 60% 108 +1.98%
Price run-up before the record date
+2.14% how far the stock outpaces the index in the three weeks before the record date, median over all payouts

The lead grows with the size of the payout: +0.67% at a yield of up to 3% and +4.93% at 9-15%; for payouts above 15% it is lower, +1.98%. So by the record date the dividend is already priced in.

the row expands: the stock's latest record dates
Security Payouts Yielddividend, median Declineshare of the dividend Closedwithin 20 days Closedwithin 60 days Recoverymedian, days Leadvs index before record date
SBER Sberbank 13 5.84% 0.69 46% 62% 19 +5.47%
GAZP Gazprom 10 5.53% 0.68 10% 60% 32 +1.65%
LKOH LUKOIL 25 3.81% 0.69 60% 72% 9 +2.39%
T T-Technologies 7 1.15% 1.05 86% 86% 6 -0.09%
VTBR VTB Bank 10 2.91% 0.60 60% 60% 10 -0.51%
NVTK NOVATEK 28 1.39% 1.00 61% 68% 6 +1.99%
ROSN Rosneft 22 3.49% 0.86 50% 73% 14 +2.79%
YDEX Yandex 5 1.95% 1.15 40% 75% 14 +1.65%
GMKN Nornickel 24 4.40% 0.72 58% 79% 10 +4.17%
PLZL Polyus 19 2.68% 0.54 74% 79% 8 +1.69%
SMLT Samolet 4 2.06% -0.95 100% 100% 3 -1.17%
X5 X5 Group 3 12.16% 0.89 0% 33% 22 +3.24%
TATN Tatneft 30 3.62% 0.72 62% 86% 12 +1.91%
MAGN MMK 24 3.17% 0.75 42% 67% 19 +2.00%
SNGSP Surgutneftegas pref 14 14.28% 0.81 43% 57% 8 +2.62%
AFLT Aeroflot 7 7.77% 0.34 71% 71% 1 -0.26%
AFKS AFK Sistema 13 2.37% 0.57 69% 92% 7 -2.22%
CHMF Severstal 33 2.64% 1.15 61% 82% 8 +1.49%
NLMK NLMK 31 2.73% 0.94 68% 84% 9 +2.79%
MGNT Magnit 24 1.48% 0.78 71% 79% 4 +2.83%
SVCB Sovcombank 3 3.48% 0.79 67% 67% 10 +4.13%
ALRS ALROSA 15 4.90% 0.78 47% 60% 14 +3.59%
MOEX Moscow Exchange 14 6.23% 0.80 21% 50% 34 +4.35%
MTSS MTS 24 6.11% 0.86 38% 54% 20 -0.14%
TRNFP Transneft pref 10 8.94% 0.68 10% 30% 65 +3.75%
SNGS Surgutneftegas 14 2.36% 0.55 93% 93% 1 -1.97%
SBERP Sberbank pref 13 6.27% 0.62 46% 62% 21 +5.59%
PHOR PhosAgro 47 2.08% 0.72 66% 87% 7 +1.52%
SIBN Gazprom Neft 27 3.90% 0.69 54% 73% 18 +2.60%
HEAD HeadHunter 4 8.02% 0.93 25% 33% 7 +2.47%
IRAO Inter RAO 11 4.19% 0.81 55% 55% 4 +2.16%
POSI Positive Technologies 8 1.59% 0.40 50% 75% 7 -0.70%
PIKK PIK 6 3.99% 0.47 67% 83% 8 +4.47%
TATNP Tatneft pref 30 4.87% 0.71 52% 90% 17 +4.45%
RTKM Rostelecom 15 4.93% 0.63 40% 53% 32 +1.96%
FLOT Sovcomflot 5 6.98% 0.60 40% 40% 2 -0.93%
SFIN SFI 7 6.05% 1.06 43% 57% 24 +2.37%
ASTR Astra Group 4 1.45% 2.52 75% 75% 6 +0.15%
UPRO Unipro 9 4.02% 0.90 56% 67% 13 -0.29%
BSPB Bank Saint Petersburg 18 6.81% 0.94 41% 47% 47 +4.96%
EUTR EuroTrans 7 5.70% 0.96 29% 71% 26 +4.27%
FEES FGC Rosseti 7 6.12% 0.79 29% 57% 28 +2.43%
SELG Seligdar 8 5.12% 1.02 38% 50% 25 +4.99%
BELU NovaBev Group 16 3.06% 0.57 69% 81% 5 -0.09%
MDMG MD Medical Group 10 2.81% 0.46 78% 89% 8 +4.02%
HYDR RusHydro 10 5.98% 0.55 40% 80% 21 +0.50%
RENI Renaissance Insurance 6 4.96% 0.80 50% 67% 17 -2.71%
MTLRP Mechel pref 6 4.21% 1.00 33% 33% 64 -1.94%
BANEP Bashneft pref 14 11.53% 0.77 29% 50% 33 +1.44%
TRMK TMK 18 4.25% 0.82 44% 61% 2 +1.03%
OZPH Ozon Pharmaceuticals 7 0.53% 0.73 71% 86% 1 +0.30%
NMTP NMTP 16 8.41% 0.78 62% 69% 6 +2.58%
MSNG Mosenergo 13 5.52% 0.79 38% 54% 20 +2.60%
RASP Raspadskaya 6 2.59% 0.86 50% 100% 19 +3.55%
RTKMP Rostelecom pref 15 7.19% 0.77 27% 33% 53 +3.67%
MRKClow turnover Rosseti Center 14 7.58% 0.76 43% 50% 25 +3.30%
AQUAlow turnover Inarctica 16 1.73% 0.84 75% 94% 4 +3.63%
LSNGPlow turnover Rosseti Lenenergo pref 13 9.51% 0.83 15% 54% 26 +6.53%
VSEHlow turnover VI.ru 3 2.60% 1.59 33% 67% 28 +0.05%
LSRGlow turnover LSR Group 14 8.97% 0.93 21% 36% 64 +3.65%
MRKPlow turnover Rosseti Center and Volga 12 11.32% 0.81 33% 33% 81 +6.38%
LEASlow turnover Europlan 4 8.55% 0.97 50% 75% 17 +5.44%
MRKVlow turnover Rosseti Volga 10 9.09% 0.59 60% 70% 8 +0.42%
MVIDlow turnover M.Video 12 6.70% 0.70 50% 50% 16 +0.88%
OGKBlow turnover OGK-2 7 7.64% 0.61 29% 43% 42 +7.18%
MSRSlow turnover Rosseti Moscow Region 16 4.92% 0.79 31% 75% 34 +1.75%
SVAVlow turnover Sollers 6 9.14% 0.82 33% 33% 1 +2.35%
DIASlow turnover Diasoft 9 1.27% 1.28 56% 78% 3 -2.64%
BANElow turnover Bashneft 14 8.12% 0.72 50% 57% 20 -0.70%
VSMOlow turnover VSMPO-AVISMA 14 4.99% 0.89 36% 57% 44 +3.31%
MRKUlow turnover Rosseti Ural 12 9.73% 0.86 42% 67% 20 +7.62%
NKHPlow turnover NKHP 24 2.65% 0.78 62% 71% 10 -1.78%
HNFGlow turnover Henderson 5 3.27% 0.83 40% 40% 5 +0.89%
ZAYMlow turnover Zaymer 9 4.33% 0.71 38% 62% 18 +1.79%
GCHElow turnover Cherkizovo Group 23 3.24% 1.06 45% 55% 16 +4.13%
AKRNlow turnover Acron 21 2.91% 0.81 48% 81% 21 +1.28%
MGKLlow turnover MGKL 3 6.16% -0.36 100% 100% 4 +0.06%
NKNCPlow turnover Nizhnekamskneftekhim pref 13 5.82% 0.65 46% 62% 11 +3.38%
LSNGlow turnover Rosseti Lenenergo 13 2.32% 0.83 69% 85% 4 -3.75%
KAZTlow turnover Kuibyshevazot 27 1.22% 0.45 78% 85% 4 +1.16%
MGTSPlow turnover MGTS pref 7 12.18% 0.99 14% 14% 131 +2.85%
KZOSlow turnover Organichesky Sintez 16 5.35% 0.71 44% 69% 18 +3.20%
TTLKlow turnover Tattelecom 12 6.60% 1.28 8% 8% 141 +7.55%
NKNClow turnover Nizhnekamskneftekhim 13 4.20% 0.13 77% 85% 7 +4.16%
MGTSlow turnover MGTS 7 10.36% 0.39 29% 29% 102 +3.83%
"Drop" is the share of the dividend by which the price fell on the gap day: 0.8 means that with a 10-rouble payout the price fell by 8 roubles. "Time to close" counts only gaps that closed, so it is understated for stocks with many unclosed gaps; read it together with the "within 20" and "within 60 days" columns. The "low turnover" tag means median turnover below 50 mn ₽ a day: there single trades move the price, and the figures reflect liquidity rather than the reaction to the dividend.
All companiesevery metric in one table
Company Checkspassed out of those calculated Backed by cash EBITDA to valueEBITDA / EV for 2025 ProfitabilityROE, profit to equity Greenblatt placeof 83 Default riskbuffer · probability
VSEH VI.ru 8/8 298% 32.9% 72.0% 1 5.12σ · < 0.01%
CNRU Cian 8/8 155% 9.5% 51.0% 44 no net debt
CBOM MKB 2/2 — — 6.1% — —
DOMRF DOM.RF 2/2 — — 18.9% — —
MBNK MTS Bank 2/2 — — 11.4% — —
MGKL MGKL 2/2 — — 40.9% — —
RENI Renaissance Insurance 2/2 — — 19.5% — —
SBER Sberbank 2/2 — — 20.4% — —
SBERP Sberbank pref 2/2 — — 20.4% — —
T T-Technologies 2/2 — — 25.9% — —
ZAYM Zaymer 2/2 — — 30.0% — —
NMTP NMTP 7/8 82% 63.2% 20.7% 3 no net debt
MRKP Rosseti Center and Volga 7/8 47% 76.1% 20.1% 4 9.42σ · < 0.01%
ELFV EL5-Energo 7/8 67% 44.9% 23.8% 5 3.31σ · 0.05%
MRKV Rosseti Volga 7/8 28% 52.8% 20.7% 6 9.13σ · < 0.01%
DIAS Diasoft 7/8 84% 30.5% 31.6% 7 no net debt
MRKC Rosseti Center 7/8 27% 59.6% 15.8% 12 2.53σ · 0.57%
BELU NovaBev Group 7/8 95% 26.5% 23.4% 17 3.22σ · 0.06%
GEMC United Medical Group 7/8 107% 22.0% 29.9% 22 no net debt
YDEX Yandex 7/8 78% 19.8% 40.3% 23 10.90σ · < 0.01%
BTBR B2B-RTS 7/8 116% 16.5% 88.6% 28 no net debt
DATA Arenadata Group 7/8 108% 16.5% 49.4% 34 no net debt
LSNG Rosseti Lenenergo 6/8 46% 78.2% 15.3% 8 no net debt
LSNGP Rosseti Lenenergo pref 6/8 46% 78.2% 15.3% 8 no net debt
FEES FGC Rosseti 6/8 31% 101.5% 9.1% 13 1.86σ · 3.16%
DVEC DEC 6/8 33% 39.8% 16.5% 15 3.82σ · 0.01%
MRKU Rosseti Ural 6/8 59% 41.1% 16.2% 17 5.54σ · < 0.01%
TTLK Tattelecom 6/8 119% 54.3% 13.9% 17 no net debt
TRNFP Transneft pref 6/8 36% 143.9% 7.7% 20 no net debt
ASTR Astra Group 6/8 19% 18.9% 56.2% 24 no net debt
BAZA Basis 6/8 89% 18.5% 40.1% 28 no net debt
PHOR PhosAgro 6/8 20% 16.7% 42.9% 33 5.35σ · < 0.01%
GMKN Nornickel 6/8 84% 18.3% 18.5% 48 4.37σ · < 0.01%
MDMG MD Medical Group 6/8 94% 13.2% 29.6% 48 12.59σ · < 0.01%
AKRN Acron 6/8 13% 11.7% 18.4% 62 10.30σ · < 0.01%
MRKS Rosseti Siberia 6/8 409% 18.6% 7.4% 66 2.49σ · 0.64%
HEAD HeadHunter 6/8 106% 20.0% 55.3%* — no net debt
MGTS MGTS 6/8 50% — 14.9% — no net debt
MGTSP MGTS pref 6/8 50% — 14.9% — no net debt
PLZL Polyus 6/8 57% 31.8% 72.6%* — 2.80σ · 0.25%
UPRO Unipro 6/8 57% — 17.6% — no net debt
FIXR Fix Price 5/8 85% 51.1% 18.2% 8 3.58σ · 0.02%
MSRS Rosseti Moscow Region 5/8 -5% 61.1% 16.2% 10 3.65σ · 0.01%
BANE Bashneft 5/8 138% 65.3% 5.4% 30 6.41σ · < 0.01%
BANEP Bashneft pref 5/8 138% 65.3% 5.4% 30 6.41σ · < 0.01%
GAZP Gazprom 5/8 25% 34.3% 5.9% 40 2.72σ · 0.33%
OZPH Ozon Pharmaceuticals 5/8 -5% 18.8% 18.6% 46 8.32σ · < 0.01%
LENT Lenta 5/8 41% 17.5% 19.4% 48 3.40σ · 0.03%
POSI Positive Technologies 5/8 -18% 11.7% 30.0% 52 4.89σ · < 0.01%
PRMD Promomed 5/8 -66% 12.7% 26.8% 53 6.75σ · < 0.01%
GCHE Cherkizovo Group 5/8 25% 19.6% 13.0% 55 4.07σ · < 0.01%
NVTK NOVATEK 5/8 193% 24.4% 6.5% 55 no net debt
KAZT Kuibyshevazot 5/8 220% 22.1% 5.8% 57 5.62σ · < 0.01%
LKOH LUKOIL 5/8 574% 25.7% 2.8% 58 no net debt
ROSN Rosneft 5/8 239% 25.0% 3.2% 60 3.02σ · 0.13%
MRKY Rosseti South 5/8 32% 16.4% 6.8% 69 3.83σ · 0.01%
UTAR UTair 5/8 91% 16.8% 5.6% 69 3.65σ · 0.01%
VSMO VSMPO-AVISMA 5/8 1601% 6.5% 0.1% 79 9.32σ · < 0.01%
OZON Ozon 4/7 loss 14.1% 15.7%* — 3.40σ · 0.03%
GLRX Glorax 4/8 -684% 25.5% 42.9% 10 1.71σ · 4.40%
PIKK PIK 4/8 -94% 34.5% 16.7% 16 no net debt
X5 X5 Group 4/8 27% 17.5% 85.8% 25 3.13σ · 0.09%
MSNG Mosenergo 4/8 32% 899.9% 1.7% 31 no net debt
TATN Tatneft 4/8 76% 30.2% 12.0% 34 no net debt
TATNP Tatneft pref 4/8 76% 30.2% 12.0% 34 no net debt
HYDR RusHydro 4/8 -190% 23.3% 16.4% 36 1.99σ · 2.32%
NLMK NLMK 4/8 51% 34.1% 7.1% 37 no net debt
UGLD UGC 4/8 -68% 17.9% 24.1% 39 3.12σ · 0.09%
NKHP NKHP 4/8 65% 19.6% 18.3% 43 no net debt
RTKM Rostelecom 4/8 45% 37.1% 5.1% 44 2.09σ · 1.85%
RTKMP Rostelecom pref 4/8 45% 37.1% 5.1% 44 2.09σ · 1.85%
MRKK Rosseti North Caucasus 3/6 loss -28.8% -11.2%* — —
SNGS Surgutneftegas 2/4 — — 28.3%* — —
SNGSP Surgutneftegas pref 2/4 — — 28.3%* — —
BSPB Bank Saint Petersburg 1/2 — — 17.4% — —
LEAS Europlan 1/2 — — 12.1% — —
MOEX Moscow Exchange 1/2 — — 21.4% — —
SFIN SFI 1/2 — — 7.2% — —
SPBE SPB Exchange 1/2 — — 2.6% — —
SVCB Sovcombank 1/2 — — 12.0% — —
VTBR VTB Bank 1/2 — — 18.0% — —
MAGN MMK 3/7 loss 43.4% -2.1% 47 no net debt
FESH FESCO 3/7 loss 13.8% -1.5% 76 7.24σ · < 0.01%
VKCO VK 3/7 loss 15.6% -16.6% 77 2.79σ · 0.26%
AFLT Aeroflot 3/8 -575% 38.8% 34.0% 2 1.98σ · 2.36%
HNFG Henderson 3/8 -4% 20.5% 23.0% 27 3.73σ · 0.01%
FLOT Sovcomflot 3/8 -4% 26.7% 8.5% 40 6.04σ · < 0.01%
IRAO Inter RAO 3/8 -28% — 11.7% — no net debt
MTSS MTS 3/8 -98% 25.7% 34.7%* — 3.03σ · 0.12%
CHMK CMK 2/6 loss -1.7% -41.5% 82 —
OGKB OGK-2 2/6 loss — -1.1% — 3.11σ · 0.09%
SMLT Samolet 2/7 loss 28.5% -6.5% 60 0.61σ · 26.98%
TRMK TMK 2/7 loss 20.2% -64.7% 71 1.42σ · 7.73%
SELG Seligdar 2/7 loss 19.5% -74.9% 74 1.50σ · 6.70%
RASP Raspadskaya 2/7 loss -44.9% -38.8% 82 no net debt
IVAT IVA 2/8 -16% 30.4% 21.8% 13 3.95σ · < 0.01%
RNFT RussNeft 2/8 -16% 33.3% 16.7% 21 1.60σ · 5.50%
SVAV Sollers 2/8 -56% 31.0% 14.3% 25 1.57σ · 5.76%
EUTR EuroTrans 2/8 -416% 30.0% 14.0% 31 0.60σ · 27.54%
SIBN Gazprom Neft 2/8 -67% 30.9% 8.0% 37 6.37σ · < 0.01%
LSRG LSR Group 2/8 -1323% 27.9% 8.1% 42 2.36σ · 0.92%
RAGR Rusagro 2/8 -267% 25.6% 7.7% 48 1.43σ · 7.64%
ALRS ALROSA 2/8 -83% 21.7% 8.9% 53 3.01σ · 0.13%
CHMF Severstal 2/8 -95% 20.6% 6.1% 59 7.00σ · < 0.01%
ABIO ARTGEN 2/8 -181% 4.7% 20.5% 62 6.24σ · < 0.01%
ENPG EN+ Group 2/8 -91% 22.3% 5.1% 65 1.52σ · 6.40%
SOFL Softline 2/8 -546% 16.6% 8.4% 67 2.56σ · 0.53%
KZOS Organichesky Sintez 2/8 -218% 19.5% 5.1% 68 4.16σ · < 0.01%
AQUA Inarctica 2/8 -7% 12.5% 5.4% 75 4.09σ · < 0.01%
APTK Apteka 36.6 2/8 -151% 9.0% 7.2%* — 3.48σ · 0.03%
ETLN Etalon Group 1/7 loss 21.3% -78.0% 71 1.32σ · 9.40%
MGNT Magnit 1/7 loss 13.5% -21.7% 78 1.41σ · 7.95%
RUAL RUSAL 1/7 loss 8.2% -7.2% 81 2.24σ · 1.25%
DELI Delimobil 1/7 loss 14.4% 20.1%* — 1.52σ · 6.48%
NKNC Nizhnekamskneftekhim 1/8 -51% 19.7% 7.1% 62 2.61σ · 0.45%
NKNCP Nizhnekamskneftekhim pref 1/8 -51% 19.7% 7.1% 62 2.61σ · 0.45%
WUSH Whoosh 0/7 loss 20.1% -73.2% 73 1.25σ · 10.53%
ELMT Element 0/7 loss 8.5% -6.2% 80 5.19σ · < 0.01%
MTLR Mechel 0/7 loss 2.9% 2.7%* — 1.18σ · 11.86%
MTLRP Mechel pref 0/7 loss 2.9% 2.7%* — 1.18σ · 11.86%
MVID M.Video 0/6 loss -14.1% -9.4%* — —
BLNG Belon 0/3 — — — — —
AFKS AFK Sistema 0/2 — — — — —
Buffer - by how many typical yearly swings the value of the assets exceeds the debt; the model is explained on the "Default risk" tab. An asterisk next to profitability means the EBITDA margin is used instead of ROE because ROE is unreliable: equity shrank after large dividends and ROE climbed to hundreds of percent, or ROE is positive despite a loss. A dash in the place column means one of the two metrics is missing.
Data source: Moscow Exchange and company annual reports for 2025, calculated by FairValue, updated hourly. The models rank companies but do not value the business or forecast returns: each has assumptions and simplifications, named in its section, and the source data can be incomplete and arrive late. Not an individual investment recommendation.

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